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t present, interdomain routing is considered a chal-
lenging research area [1]. This is mainly rooted in
the following two facts.
First, the interdomain routing protocol currently
used in the Internet has several limitations, but its replacement is
not a realistic option due to its worldwide deployment. These limi-
tations are becoming especially noticeable given the explosive
growth the network has experienced in these last few years [2]. This
growth refers not only to the size of the network, but also to the
amount of and variety of the applications actually available on the
Internet. This growth tendency is placing significant stress on both
the scalability and capabilities of the interdomain routing protocol.
Second, as its name indicates, interdomain routing denotes
routing among distinct domains or networks. These domains are
completely autonomous entities, which perform their own rout-
ing management based on policies that only have local signifi-
cance. In this scenario conditions such as business and
competition between domains, along with fully independent
management using potentially conflicting policies, makes the
problem of interdomain routing even harder.
The goals of this article are first to present an up-to-date
inspection of some of the main open issues in interdomain rout-
ing. Second, we intend to survey the state of the art and briefly
describe some of the most relevant proposals in the area. Third,
we seek to point out why these issues are so difficult to solve at
present, and succinctly explain why most of the existing propos-
als have never moved into a deployment stage. Our aim is to put
things in perspective and summarize the main lessons learned.
This article is addressed to both nonexperts, and researchers
and professionals familiar with this particular research area. The
rest of the article is organized as follows. We provide a brief
introduction to interdomain routing so that nonexpert readers
can become acquainted of the framework on which the rest of
the article is developed. We present an up-to-date analysis of
several of the main research challenges in the area. We also
describe the most appealing approaches addressing each of
these challenges, and explain why, despite this, they remain
largely unsolved. Finally, we conclude the article.1
The Basics of Interdomain Routing
The current Internet is a decentralized collection of computer
networks from all around the world. Each of these networks is
typically known as a domain or an autonomous system (AS). An
AS is in fact a network or group of networks under a common
routing policy, and managed by a single authority. Today, the
Internet is basically the interconnection of more than 20,000
ASes [4]. Every one of these ASes usually uses one or more inte-
rior gateway protocols (IGPs), such as Intermediate System to
Intermediate System (IS-IS) or Open Shortest Path First
(OSPF), to exchange routing information within the AS. This is
known as intradomain routing. On the other hand, interdomain
routing focuses on the exchange of routes to allow the transmis-
sion of packets between different ASes.
Figure 1 illustrates a simplified (but typical) interdomain sce-
nario depicting the interconnection of several ASes. All the ASes
represented in the figure have multiple connections to the net-
work. This is indeed a common practice nowadays, and it is mainly
used for resilience and load balancing. When an AS is connected
to multiple different ASes, it is referred to as a multihomed AS.
On the other hand, ASes connected to a single AS are known as
single-homed ASes. To fix ideas, all the ASes present in Fig. 1 are
multihomed except AS3. Even though AS3 is dually connected to
the Internet, both connections are with the same AS (AS31).
The Internet is composed of three different types of ASes:
• Single-homed stub ASes such as AS3 in Fig. 1
• Multihomed stub ASes such as AS1 and AS2 in Fig. 1
• Transit ASes, which can be classified into very large transit
ASes making up what is usually referred to as the Internet
core, and smaller-sized transit ASes such as AS11, AS12,
AS21–AS23, and AS31 in Fig. 1.
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The two types of stub ASes crowd together mostly medium
and large enterprise customers, content service providers (CSPs),
and small network service providers (NSPs). These two groups
correspond to the largest fraction of ASes present in the Inter-
net. The third type includes most Internet service providers
(ISPs) in the Internet.
In today’s Internet, there is a hierarchy of transit ASes [5]. This
hierarchical structure is rooted in the two different types of rela-
tionships that could exist between ASes (i.e., customer-provider
or peer-to-peer). Thus, for each transit AS any directly connected
AS is either a customer or peer. At the top of this hierarchy we
found the largest ISPs, which are usually referred to as Tier-1
ISPs. There are about 20 Tier-1s at present [5], which represents
less than 0.1 percent of the total number of ASes in the Internet
[4]. These Tier-1s are directly interconnected in almost a full
mesh and compose the Internet core. In the core all relationships
between Tier-1s are peer-to-peer, so a Tier-1 is any ISP lacking
an upstream provider. The second level of the hierarchy is com-
posed of Tier-2 ISPs. A Tier-2 is any transit AS that is a customer
of one or more Tier-1 ISPs. A representative example of a Tier-2
ISP is a national service provider. Tier-2 ISPs tend to establish
peer-to-peer relationships with other neighboring Tier-2s for both
economical and performance reasons. This is typically the case for
geographically close Tier-2 ISPs that exchange large amounts of
traffic. There are also Tier-3 ISPs, which are those transit ASes in
the hierarchy that are customers of one or more Tier-2 ISP, such
as regional ISPs within a country. Stub ASes are non-transit ASes
that are customers of any ISP (Tier-1, Tier-2, or Tier-3). In Fig. 1
ISPs such as AS11, AS12, AS21, AS23, and AS31 would be classi-
fied as Tier-2 ISPs, while AS22 represents a Tier-3 ISP. An
important corollary of this hierarchical structure is that the diame-
ter of the Internet is very small in terms of AS hops.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is currently the de
facto standard interdomain routing protocol in the Internet.
Its current official2 release is BGP-4, which was specified in
[6] on March of 1995. BGP is used to exchange reachability
information throughout the Internet, and it is mainly an inter-
AS routing protocol. However, the reachability information an
AS learns from the exterior needs to be distributed within the
AS so that every router in the AS could properly reach desti-
nations outside the AS. When reachability information is
exchanged between two BGP routers located in different
ASes, the protocol is referred to as external BGP (eBGP). On
the other hand, when reachability information is exchanged
between BGP routers located inside the same AS, the proto-
col is referred to as internal BGP (iBGP).
For instance, in AS1 the reachability information R11 learns
from AS11 is received over eBGP. This information is passed
from R11 to the routers inside AS1 (i.e., R12 and R13) so that
they are able to reach the routes advertised by AS11. This
exchange of reachability information between R11 and the inter-
nal routers in AS1 is done by means of iBGP. The same occurs
for the external routes R12 learns from AS12.
For scalability reasons BGP does not try to keep track of the
entire Internet’s topology. Instead, it only manages the end-to-
end AS path of one route in the form of an ordered sequence of
AS numbers. For this reason BGP is known as a path vector
routing protocol, to reflect the fact that it is essentially a modi-
fied distance vector protocol. While a typical distance vector pro-
tocol like RIP chooses a route according to the least number of
routers traversed (router hops), BGP generally chooses the route
that traverses the least number of ASes (AS hops). For example,
the BGP process running in router R21 will typically choose to
reach AS1 via the ASes AS21 and AS12. Thus, the AS path cho-
sen by R21 is {AS21, AS12, AS1} (please notice that the Inter-
net core accounts for at least one AS hop more in the AS path if
only one Tier-1 ISP is traversed while reaching AS1).
The term generally mentioned before is due to the fact that
the AS path length is one of the steps of the BGP decision pro-
cess, but not the only one. This decision process is used for route
selection each time a BGP router has at least two different
routes for the same destination. Thus, BGP routing is more com-
plex than simply minimizing the number of AS hops. BGP
routers have built-in features to override the AS hop count, and
to tiebreak if two or more routes have the same AS path length.
The sequence of steps in Fig. 2 represents a simplified version of
the BGP decision process.
In this process each subsequent step is used to break ties when
the routes being compared were equally good in the previous
step. The local preference (LOCAL_PREF) in step 1 and the
multi-exit discriminator (MED) in step 3 are two BGP attributes
that are used by BGP routers for controlling how traffic flows
from and into an AS, respectively. A detailed explanation of this
process can be found in [7].
After this short description of the main components and their
roles in interdomain routing, we follow with some of the main
open issues in this area.
Research Challenges in Interdomain Routing
In the last years the Internet has largely expanded in several ways.
First, the number of ASes connected to the Internet has increased
enormously [2]. Second, the number of connections per AS to the
network has also significantly augmented [8]. Third, the number
and diversity of the applications supported in the Internet have
remarkably increased as well. This tendency has increased the
demands on the scale of the network, and hence is placing signifi-
cant pressure on the scalability and convergence of BGP.
In addition, the current interdomain routing structure is not
precisely prepared to handle the service characteristics several
applications are demanding from the network. In effect, the end-
to-end performance of these applications is not only affected by
the limitations of BGP, but also by the diversity of interests and
lack of cooperation between the ASes composing the Internet.
Therefore, several issues remain to be solved in the area of inter-
domain routing. This section analyzes several significant chal-
lenges faced by researchers in the area today. The methodology
we follow is first to introduce the problem. Next, we survey sev-
eral proposals addressing the issue, and try to discriminate which
are in fact operational palliatives. After that, we discuss why
despite these efforts each issue remains largely open.
The order in which the issues are presented is chosen so as to
gradually introduce the distinct aspects of BGP and the interdo-
main routing paradigm, as well as to link how the initial set of
issues influences the subsequent ones.






















2 The IDR working group of the IETF has finalized the revision of [6].
This revision documents the currently deployed code.
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Slow Convergence and Chattiness of BGP
In order to exchange reachability information, two BGP routers
must establish a BGP session. This session is supported by a
TCP connection through which the peers exchange four differ-
ent types of messages, specifically [6]:
• OPEN message: to open a BGP session between peers.
• UPDATE message: to transfer reachability information among
peers. This message is used to either advertise a feasible route
to a peer or withdraw infeasible routes. The UPDATE mes-
sage is usually referred to as a BGP advertisement.
• NOTIFICATION message: sent when an error condition is
detected. The BGP session is immediately shut down after
this message is sent.
• KEEPALIVE message: periodically exchanged to verify that
the peer is still reachable.
Each peer is able to determine if the BGP session corre-
sponds to an iBGP or eBGP session from the content of the
OPEN message. When a BGP session starts, each peer advertis-
es its entire set of routes. After that, only incremental updates
and KEEPALIVE messages are exchanged.
An important performance metric for a routing protocol is its
convergence time (i.e., the time required to reroute packets
around a failure). The first significant studies of the convergence
of BGP were carried out using measurements in the Internet [9].
These studies showed that the convergence of BGP was rather
slow, often measured in tens of seconds. This slow convergence is
caused by several factors, some of which are inherent to the uti-
lization of path vectors by BGP, while others are due to imple-
mentation choices. In short, this slow convergence is mainly rooted
in the fact that in the global Internet, a single link failure can force
all BGP routers to exchange large amounts of BGP advertise-
ments, while exploring for alternative paths toward the affected
destinations. This process is referred to as path exploration.
During BGP convergence, routers may need to exchange sev-
eral advertisements concerning the same prefix. To avoid storms
of BGP advertisements, most BGP routers use a timer called
minimum route advertisement interval (MRAI), with a recom-
mended default value of 30 s. This timer prevents BGP routers
from sending a new advertisement for one prefix if the previous
advertisement for the prefix was sent less than 30 s earlier [6].
This reduces the number of BGP advertisements exchanged, but
may cause important BGP advertisements to be unnecessarily
delayed. Griffin and Presmore showed in [10] that this arbitrary
30 s value has a huge impact on BGP convergence time. They
observed that for each network topology and a particular set of
experiments, there is an optimal value of the MRAI timer. This
optimal value can significantly reduce the convergence time of
BGP. Unfortunately, this might be extremely hard to find in
practice since it varies from network to network.
To cope with flapping routers that regularly advertise and
shortly after withdraw their routes, many routers implement
BGP route flap damping [11]. This technique works by ignoring
routes that change too often. This is necessary to avoid storms
of advertisements due to flapping routers, but unfortunately it
increases BGP convergence time [12].
Several authors have proposed modifications to reduce the
BGP convergence time in case of failures. The ghost-flushing
approach proposed in [13] improves the BGP convergence by
ensuring that the messages indicating bad news are distributed
quickly by the BGP routers, while good news propagates more
slowly. The downside of ghost-flushing is that it does not tackle
the root of the problem, i.e., path exploration. Instead, it only
tries to speed up the convergence of BGP.
Other solutions such as BGP-RCN [14] and EPIC [15]
improve the convergence of BGP and also reduce the number of
BGP messages exchanged during the convergence by adding to
each BGP message an identifier (root-cause) indicating the cause
of the BGP message. With this additional information, when a
failure occurs on one link, distant routers can avoid to select as
their alternate path a path that is also affected by the failure but
for which they have not yet received up-to-date information.
The good news is that these proposals significantly limit path
exploration. The bad news is that accurately identifying the root
cause of a failure still represents a challenging problem. This is
first because root cause approaches require modifying BGP to add
information to BGP advertisements, but ISPs are cautious about
upgrading BGP. Second, they only introduce significant improve-
ments under the assumption of extensive deployment. And most
important of all, the additional information needed to identify the
root cause of a failure works against the scalability of BGP.
The explanation for this latter is that for scalability reasons
the BGP advertisements spawned by ISPs are often aggregated.
Two levels of aggregation exist in these advertisements. First,
the set of destinations advertised by BGP routers are composed
by IP prefixes that aggregate several routes into a single route.3
Second, the AS paths carried in the BGP advertisements intrin-
sically represent highly aggregated information, since they do
not reveal any clue about the internal details of the ASes in the
path (e.g., topology, state of connectivity). While the first level
of aggregation reduces the size of BGP routing tables, the sec-
ond tremendously reduces the amount of detail exchanged
between BGP routers. The downside is loss of granularity in the
reachability information each BGP router manages. In this
framework pinpointing the source of a failure is almost impossi-
ble, given that different failures will produce the same BGP
UPDATE message [15]. To cope with this, the BGP advertise-
ments from ISPs should be somehow disaggregated, which
unfortunately has a direct impact on BGP’s scalability.
Clearly, two trade-offs exist:
• How to disaggregate, and how much reachability information
should be disaggregated in the BGP advertisements so as to
accurately identify the source of a failure
• How much BGP convergence time could be reduced while
keeping the overall routing system scalable
An interesting alternative to pinpoint the source of a failure
without needing to modify BGP was proposed in [16]. Feldmann
et al. propose inferring the precise location of a failure by ana-
lyzing its effects (i.e., observing the flow of BGP UPDATE mes-
sages during a convergence process). This is achieved by using
multiple observation points (known as vantage points) and corre-
lating the data observed along three dimensions: time, vantage
point, and prefixes. However, this work proposes an offline
methodology to pinpoint the source of a failure, so it was not
devised as a mechanism to reduce BGP convergence time.
Figure 3 depicts three major interdomain routing objectives
as well as how the set of mechanisms described above strength-
en or weaken the accomplishment of these objectives. The fig-
n Figure 2. A simplified version of the BGP route selection pro-
cess.
1. Choose the route with the highest local preference 
(LOCAL_PREF)
2. If the LOCAL_PREFs are equal choose the route with the 
shortest AS-path
3. If the AS-path lengths are equal choose the route with the 
lowest MED
4. If the MEDs are equal prefer external routes over internal 
routes (eBGP over iBGP)
5. If the routes are still equal prefer the one with the lowest IGP
metric to the next-hop router
6. If more than one route is still available run tie-breaking rules
3 This aggregation process will be exemplified later.
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ure shows that unfortunately, none of the
existing mechanisms is able to strengthen
the accomplishment of some of the objec-
tives without weakening the accomplish-
ment of some other. From our perspective
the issue remains largely unsolved, and will
remain in this state unless we thoroughly
understand the intrinsic trade-offs between
some of the objectives in Fig. 3 and, based
on this understanding, succeed in develop-
ing novel mechanisms that could timely
balance the accomplishment of all the
objectives at the same time.
Scalability Problems Due to
Multihoming
Several studies such as [17] have shown
that BGP routing tables are growing sig-
nificantly fast, which imposes a consider-
able pressure on the scalability of BGP. In
the early 1990s, such a growth resulted in
the definition of the CIDR IP address allocation architecture.
The main reason for the recent growth lies in the fact that most
stub ASes have chosen to increment their connectivity to the
Internet for both resilience and load balancing reasons. As stat-
ed earlier, this practice of connecting to multiple ISPs is known
as multihoming. To explain how multihoming affects the size of
BGP routing tables, let us consider the example in Fig. 4.
Assume that multihomed stub AS1 originates two IP prefixes,
194.100.80.0/20 (obtained from AS2’s block of IP prefixes) and
200.2.160.0/20 (obtained from AS3). In order to load balance
its inbound traffic and count with a fault-tolerant routing
scheme, AS1 chooses to advertise its prefixes so that:
• Traffic targeting 194.100.80.0/20 should primarily enter the
AS via AS2 and use AS3 as a backup path.
• Traffic targeting 200.2.160.0/20 should primarily enter the
AS via AS3 and use AS2 as a backup path.
To accomplish these goals, AS1 selectively prepends its own
AS number in its BGP advertisements with the aim of increas-
ing the AS path length for the specific prefixes, and hence
influence selection of the best route in upstream ASes.4 Fig-
ure 4 shows the BGP advertisements sent by AS1. In this fig-
ure we assume that AS2 and AS3 are configured differently.
AS3 propagates the two BGP advertisements received from
AS1. AS2, on the other hand, sends an aggregate advertise-
ment for 194.100.0.0/16. As this prefix includes
194.100.80.0/20, the advertisement received from AS1 is not
propagated. This is typically so when a customer advertises a
prefix that belongs to one of its ISP’s block of prefixes. In
such a case the ISP could aggregate the customer advertise-
ment into a shorter prefix when advertising the prefix to other
customers or peers.
As shown in Fig. 4, even though AS1 originates only two
prefixes, AS4 receives four routes for three different prefixes:
194.100.80.0/20 (from AS3), 194.100.0.0/16 (from AS2), and
200.2.160.0/20 (from both AS3 and AS2). This increases the
size of the BGP routing table of R41 since it receives more
than one route for the same prefix.
Despite the prepending operation, all traffic from AS4
toward AS1 will be routed via AS3. This is because:
• The shortest AS-path for 200.2.160.0/20 is via AS3.
• The traffic for 194.100.80.0/20 will also be sent via AS3
because a BGP router always prefers the most specific (i.e.,
longest) prefix when forwarding packets.
In such conditions AS2 will usually stop aggregating AS1’s
prefixes so that AS1 can start receiving traffic for
194.100.80.0/20 via AS2. This disaggregation causes AS2 to
advertise two prefixes to AS4: the customer’s prefix,
194.100.80.0/20, and the aggregate 194.100.0.0/16 with an
additional increment in size of the BGP routing tables.
In the example, prefix 194.100.10.0/20 belongs to AS2, so this pre-
fix cannot be aggregated by another ISP (AS3). As a general rule, a
multihomed AS has several providers, and its prefixes cannot be
aggregated by all of its providers. In fact, when a multihomed stub
AS has allocated its own IP address space, the usual situation is that
none of the providers is able to aggregate the prefixes of this AS.
In sum, load balancing and poor aggregation are the main
reasons BGP tables are growing so fast.5 The application of
these practices makes the overall BGP routing tables nearly
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4 It is worth mentioning that even though prepending is widely used in
operational networks to influence how traffic enters an AS, for several rea-
sons it does not always work. One of these reasons is addressed in the rest
of the example. Other reasons are addressed later.
5 While the maximum number of entries in a BGP router was around 1 ×
105 in 2001, at present this number is larger than 1.63 × 105 [4, 17].
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50 percent larger than their optimal size (i.e., if aggregation
was perfectly used) [4].
To cope with the problem and leverage aggregation, most
ISPs filter the advertisements of long prefixes. Typically, several
ISPs will not allow advertising to the global Internet prefixes
longer than /22, or even longer than /20 [18]. This filtering pro-
cess is an operationally palliative, but its downsides are consider-
able. A first consequence is that some routes are not distributed
to the rest of the network. Furthermore, filtering does not tackle
the root of the problem; it only works around it. The real chal-
lenge is to devise novel proposals that endow multihomed stub
ASes with load balancing and fault tolerance mechanisms, while
diminishing (or avoiding) the impact on the BGP routing tables.
This is indeed a complex and open problem at present.
An alternative in the long term could be to define a better
multihoming architecture. Several efforts are being carried
out in order to deal with this issue in IPv6. Some appealing
solutions are currently being developed in the Site Multihom-
ing in IPv6 working group of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) [19]. However, the problem remains largely
unsolved for IPv4.
Expressiveness and Safety of Policies
Each AS in the Internet administrates its traffic in a completely
autonomous way based on a set of policies that have only local
significance to the AS. In other words, the way in which BGP
routes are advertised through the global Internet and the way in
which routing is finally performed are the result of the application
of several independently configured policies. This lack of global
coordination between the policies used in different domains is a
major weakness of the current interdomain routing paradigm.
Several studies such as [20, 21] have demonstrated that without
coordination, the interaction between independent policies may
lead to global routing anomalies, such as inconsistent recovery
from link failures or even route oscillations. Figure 5 depicts one
of these routing anomalies. This particular configuration is known
as “the bad gadget” [20], and illustrates how the policy-based
nature of BGP may lead to configurations that are guaranteed to
diverge (i.e., BGP does not converge). In this configuration the
routing policies are such that each AS prefers the counterclock-
wise route to reach AS0 instead of the direct route. For example,
AS2 prefers the route {AS2, AS1, AS0} over the route {AS2,
AS0}. Given that AS1 and AS3 have analogous preferences, this
configuration clearly causes divergence of the BGP protocol.
Earlier we assumed convergence of BGP as a fact, and based on
it we exposed that the speed of this convergence is affected not
only by the intrinsic properties of path vector routing protocols, but
also by implementation decisions of BGP. The previous example
shows that the convergence of BGP is indeed a much more com-
plex and open problem, since managing routing based on indepen-
dent policies means that convergence cannot be assumed as a fact.
The main reasons for the absence of cooperation between
domains are:
• The characteristics of the BGP policy’s expressiveness.
• The ASes are not willing to disclose details about their inter-
nal configuration and policies.
The expressiveness of policies is particularly tricky. On one
hand, this expressiveness is rich enough to construct intricate local
routing policies. Unfortunately, these policies may conflict with
policies from other domains, leading to the global routing prob-
lems described before. On the other hand, this expressiveness is
not enough to attach information to a route so that it could be
straightforwardly shared and used throughout the network.
It should become clear that both the expressiveness of poli-
cies and the basis for autonomic management of policies able
to guarantee robust convergence of the interdomain routing
protocol are in very early stages of development. We need to
thoroughly understand these two central aspects of distributed
policies in order to balance the complex trade-off between
allowing the ASes to disclose only the set of details they are
willing to disclose, and guaranteeing robust convergence of
BGP. Further discussion of these issues can be found in [22].
Robustness of BGP Sessions
The exchange of messages among two BGP routers is support-
ed by a TCP connection, which supplies a reliable transport
layer for communication between routers. Despite this reliabili-
ty, some previous studies showed that the resilience of BGP
sessions was formerly affected by congestion. In 1999 Labovitz
et al. observed that KEEPALIVE messages were delayed dur-
ing periods of peak network usage [23]. This led BGP sessions
to fail when KEEPALIVE messages were delayed beyond the
BGP hold timer [6]. Another previous study concerning the
resilience of BGP sessions to congestion was presented in [24].
This study showed that increased queuing and delays had nega-
tive effects on the resilience of BGP. One of the main conclu-
sions of [24] was the need to differentiate somehow routing
protocol messages from normal data traffic. For this reason, an
operational palliative several operators use at present is to pri-
oritize BGP messages by setting their IP precedence to 7.
More recent work such as [25] shows that the conservative
behavior of TCP retransmissions actually aggravates the instability
of BGP sessions when network failures occur. The authors ana-
lyze the case of iBGP sessions, and propose a simple modification
of TCP to increase the robustness of these sessions. Unfortunate-
ly, the community remains cautious about upgrading TCP.
Furthermore, the robustness of BGP sessions is an important
issue at present for security reasons. This is because a BGP ses-
sion will fail if the TCP connection fails due to an attack. This
is addressed in the next section.
Security Issues
Among the issues presented in this article, the one probably
capturing more attention at present is security. The reason for
this is the concern of many operators that the vulnerabilities of
BGP may cause large disruptions of service under possible
attacks [26, 27]. Two main types of security issues exist with the
current interdomain routing architecture and BGP protocol.
The first type of security issues are possible attacks on the
transmission of BGP messages by legitimate routers. Given that
two BGP peers maintain a BGP session over a TCP connection
between themselves, the endpoints of this TCP connection (IP
addresses and port numbers) can often easily be determined by
a distant attacker. Furthermore, for a BGP router, a BGP ses-
sion (and the corresponding interdomain link) remains up as
long as BGP messages can be exchanged over the TCP connec-
tion. This implies that if the TCP connection fails for any rea-
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son, the BGP session fails as well. An attacker could exploit this
weakness by sending spoofed TCP RST segments to cause a
TCP connection supporting a BGP session to fail.
To address this problem, some operational solutions are possi-
ble. A first solution is to authenticate the TCP segments carrying
BGP messages by relying on MD5 [28]. This forces BGP peers to
maintain a shared password. A second solution, mainly applica-
ble to protect iBGP sessions, is to use filters on the border
routers to ensure that spoofed packets using local addresses as
sources cannot reach the network. Those solutions are also appli-
cable to ensure that a distant attacker is not able to send spoofed
BGP messages inside an existing BGP session. Clearly, these are
operational palliatives but do not tackle the root of the problem
(i.e., how to devise robust BGP sessions among BGP routers).
The second type of security issues are related to the lack of
authentication in BGP. A BGP router can be configured to
advertise any IP prefix, and most routers support powerful fil-
ters that can be used to completely change the content of
received BGP messages.6 Besides exploiting these vulnerabilities
to conduct attacks, measurement studies have shown that mis-
configurations of BGP routers are common events [29]. In any
case, a BGP router should only be allowed to advertise IP pre-
fixes that have been either allocated to its ASes, or learned from
legitimate peer or customer ASes.
A first solution to improve the security of BGP has been pro-
posed in S-BGP [30]. S-BGP relies on a public key infra-
structure (PKI) to allow routers to include a route attestation
with each advertisement. A route attestation is a cryptographic
signature confirming that the S-BGP speaker is allowed to
advertise this path. The main concerns about S-BGP compared
to BGP are the cost (CPU, memory, and bandwidth) of produc-
ing, storing, and distributing attestations, and the need to boot-
strap the PKI. Therefore, several alternate solutions have been
proposed to lower the cost of securing BGP [31–35].
As of this writing, none of the solutions cited in the previous
paragraph have actually been implemented in operational networks.
From our perspective, this is mainly for two reasons. First, some are
too heavyweight to be deployed, which makes them unappealing to
ISPs. Second, standardization work is not well advanced. Only solu-
tions that efficiently balance the trade-off between their effectiveness
and cost to implement will have a chance at deployment.
Lack of Multipath Routing
A BGP router could receive multiple advertisements for the same
route from multiple sources. For instance, in Fig. 4 router R41
receives two advertisements for the prefix 200.2.160.0/20, and
hence will need to run its BGP decision process (Fig. 2) to select
the best path to reach this destination. In its current release BGP
selects only one path as the best path, and this is the path it places
in the forwarding table. In addition, each BGP router only adver-
tises to its peers the best route it knows to any given destination.
Thus, R41 will typically install in its forwarding table the path via
AS3 for the prefix 200.2.160.0/20 (choosing the shortest AS path),
and this is the path it will advertise to its own peers.
This behavior introduces two important limitations. First,
since the routing protocol only uses one best route, load bal-
ancing is not feasible even between paths presenting the same
AS path length. For this reason some vendors have implement-
ed and actually support multipath extensions in their BGP
implementations. Despite this fact, only the best route is still
advertised to other peers in both implementations. This is the
second and most important limitation. Given that a BGP router
only advertises the best route it knows many alternative paths
that could have been potentially used by any source of traffic
will be unknown. For example, a peer of R41 will receive an
advertisement that the network 200.2.160.0/20 is reachable via
{AS4, AS3, AS1}, but it will not know that the prefix is also
reachable via {AS4, AS2, AS1, AS1}. This causes the BGP
messages received in an AS to contain only a subset of all the
available paths to a destination. This pruning behavior inherent
in BGP introduces several limitations to the current interdo-
main routing paradigm, especially from the end-to-end quality
of service (QoS) and traffic engineering (TE) viewpoints.7
At present, efforts are being carried out so that a BGP
router will be able to advertise multiple routes for the same
destination to its peers. One of the most recent proposals can
be found in [37].
Despite the limitations described above, it is very unclear
how to endow BGP with multipath routing capabilities without
deeply impacting its scalability. If more routes are selected and
advertised by BGP routers, more entries will exist in the BGP
routing tables, increasing the problem exposed earlier.
Transit through an AS: iBGP Issues
BGP is an interdomain routing protocol and, as such, is
mainly concerned with transmission of routes and packets
between ASes. However, as an AS may contain thousands of
routers, it is necessary to specify how the interdomain routes
and packets can transit an AS. When a border router learns a
new interdomain route, it needs to distribute this route to other
routers inside its AS. This is done by sending the interdomain
routes over iBGP sessions inside the AS. If the AS is small, a
full mesh of iBGP sessions is established between the BGP
routers. If the AS is larger, route reflectors [38] or confedera-
tions [39] are used to replace this unscalable iBGP full mesh.
When a border router of a transit AS receives a packet
whose destination is not local, it will consult its BGP routing
table to determine the BGP next hop (i.e., the egress border
router) inside its own AS. However, there can be several inter-
mediate routers between the ingress router and egress router.
To ensure that an interdomain packet will reach the BGP next
hop selected by the ingress border router, the transit AS must
ensure that all intermediate routers also select this next hop.
This problem was discussed early in the development of
BGP [40], and two techniques have emerged. The first solution,
proposed in 1990, is to use encapsulation: the ingress border
router encapsulates the interdomain packets inside a tunnel
toward the egress border router chosen by its BGP decision
process. At that time, encapsulation suffered from a major per-
formance drawback given the difficulty of performing encapsu-
lation on the available routers. Today, high-end routers are
capable of performing encapsulation or decapsulation at line
rate when using multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) or IP-
based tunnels. The main advantage of using encapsulation is
that the BGP forwarding table is consulted only once (by the
ingress border router) per interdomain packet inside each AS.
Unfortunately, this is not often common practice in pure IP-
based transit networks. This type of network typically uses
another technique, called Pervasive BGP, in which BGP is run
on all (border and non-border) routers inside the transit AS. As
all intermediate routers must consult their BGP forwarding
table for each interdomain packet, there is a risk of deflection
or worse routing loops when the forwarding tables are not per-
fectly synchronized, such as during BGP convergence [41], or
when route reflectors or confederations are used [42].
The main issue at present is that route reflectors and/or con-
7 It is important to highlight that the shortest AS path does not necessarily
supply the best end-to-end traffic performance [36].
6 These filters are precisely those that support the construction of the intri-
cate and autonomic routing policies described earlier.
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federations have become absolutely necessary given the tremen-
dous scalability they have supplied to large transit ASes. How-
ever, anomalies such as those described before can occur,
especially in the event of a link or router failure with Pervasive
BGP. The question that arises, then, is how can it be guaran-
teed that iBGP configurations remain highly scalable and
anomaly-free at the same time?
Limited Traffic Engineering Capabilities
The current interdomain routing model offers scarce TE capa-
bilities for a number of reasons. First, BGP was designed as a
protocol to distribute reachability information. Second, as
exposed earlier, the inability of BGP to advertise multiple routes
for the same destination limits the number and quality of the
alternative paths that could be used to reroute packets around a
failure. In addition, the limitation of BGP in terms of multipath
routing restricts the possibilities of balancing traffic across
domains to certain setups and vendor-specific implementations.
Second, as shown previously, the autonomic management of
policies and limitations in the expressiveness of these policies
impose strong restrictions on how ASes are able to control and
manage the flow of their interdomain traffic. For instance, even
though BGP allows an AS to flexibly manage its outbound traf-
fic, it exhibits a scarce degree of control in managing and bal-
ancing how traffic enters an AS across multiple paths. In other
words, accurately controlling inbound traffic with BGP is a very
complex task, and it is still unclear how it can be optimally
accomplished. The reason for this lies in the lack of global
coordination between the policies used in different domains.
Thus, each AS in any given path may apply its own local poli-
cies and route its outbound traffic as desired, overriding any
routing advertisement and requirement from downstream ASes.
To cope with the problem of controlling the inbound traffic
of an AS, several operational palliatives are possible. Some
techniques rely on the utilization of AS path prepending [43],
some on BGP communities [44], and others on network address
translation (NAT) [45].
However, all have several limitations. A corollary of what we
exposed earlier is that AS path prepending might not always work.
BGP communities provide more control than AS path prepending,
but are neither perfect nor always supported. Finally, controlling
traffic by using NAT is simply infeasible for medium and large
ASes. As a result, the common practice in the global Internet is
that inbound traffic is manually configured and tuned on a trial
and error basis, and hence remains an open problem in terms of
interdomain TE. An incrementally deployable solution called Vir-
tual Peering was proposed recently in [46]. The approach is that a
pair of ASes cooperate and set up a unidirectional IP tunnel
between their border routers to manage the traffic between them.
Another important topic is that the objectives of interdomain
TE drastically vary depending on the type of AS. The classifica-
tion of three types of ASes made earlier is pertinent since the
requirements of and problems faced by each type are quite dif-
ferent. For instance, the current trend for multihomed stub
ASes is to deploy selfish TE techniques able to operate on
short timescales [47]. These techniques typically try to exploit
the multiconnectivity of the AS, with the aim of improving the
performance and reduce the monetary costs. The main problem
behind this is that if more and more ASes keep on using such
selfish techniques, it could place significant stress on the scala-
bility and reliability of the entire interdomain routing system.
On the other hand, TE mechanisms developed for transit mul-
tihomed ASes such as large ISPs are designed to operate on large
timescales (typically on the order of weeks or months). These
ASes usually use a routing practice known as hot potato routing
[48]. In this practice a BGP router within an AS will be able to
reach a certain destination by multiple exit points of the AS, so
the router needs to run the BGP decision process in Fig. 2. Typi-
cally, a subset of those multiple exit points will supply the same
AS path length toward the destination, so the decision BGP pro-
cess usually reaches step 4 or 5 in Fig. 2. These two steps basically
mean that the routing criterion is to try to get rid of the packets
from the AS as fast as possible. This is typically determined by the
intradomain routing protocol running on the AS (step 5, Fig. 2).
One of the main problems these transit ASes face in terms
of TE is that the attempt to improve their hot potato routing
has a profound impact on interdomain traffic (and reciprocally)
[48]. This causes traffic patterns to change across the bound-
aries of the AS, affecting other ASes. These ASes may now run
their own TE policies, which in turn may negatively impact
back on the original AS. This brings back the problem of rout-
ing instabilities due to poor or no coordination between the
policies used in different domains.
Recent studies reveal that the topological characteristics of
interdomain traffic show large variations over time. Indeed,
large fractions of AS paths are only present in the BGP routing
tables for a few minutes. This behavior increases the number of
BGP messages traversing the network. Despite this variability,
three important results demonstrate that TE at the interdomain
level is in fact feasible [49, 50]:
• Measurement studies show that in one AS, a small fraction of
the destination prefixes are responsible for a large fraction of
the interdomain traffic.
• Regardless of the large number of BGP update messages,
popular prefixes represent stable entries in the BGP routing
tables for weeks or even months.
• The majority of update events correspond to prefixes that do
not receive much traffic.
These results have important TE repercussions since
researchers can focus on devising novel TE mechanisms net-
work operators could apply to the majority of their traffic,
whose routes are typically stable.
Lack of QoS Support
Applications such as voice over IP or virtual private net-works
have strong requirements in terms of QoS. To fulfill those require-
ments, many ISPs have deployed mechanisms to provide differen-
tiated services in their networks. The customers of those ISPs are
now requiring similar levels of QoS across interdomain boundaries
[51]. BGP has no built-in QoS capabilities since it was designed
only as a protocol to distribute reachability information. This
inability of BGP to supply and distribute QoS information was rec-
ognized as a missing piece by the IETF in mid-1998 [52].
This issue has received attention during the past few years.
Due to space limitations we cannot review the entire literature,
but an appealing proposal can be found in [53].
Despite these efforts and over a decade of work, the astonish-
ing outcome is that none the proposals has turned out to be suf-
ficiently appealing to become deployed in practice. This is
because ISPs have preferred to overprovision their networks
rather than deliver and manage QoS. The debate about overpro-
vision vs. QoS is still open. Leaving aside issues like the mone-
tary cost to deploy and maintain QoS, or the development of
possible businesses leading to tangible sources of profit for ISPs,
from our perspective the issue remains unsolved mainly because
all the issues presented so far are actually strong limitations on
QoS at the interdomain level. The interdomain routing paradigm
itself is in fact a major cause for this lack of QoS support.
An alternative could be to change the paradigm, but at pre-
sent only incrementally deployable approaches seem realistic and
hence have a chance to be adopted. We believe that efficient
mechanisms allowing network operators to improve their end-to-
end performance while demanding nearly no effort to support
and maintain are still missing.
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Conclusions and Lessons Learned
Interdomain routing is still a challenging research area. The
main challenge resides in the intricate relationships and cou-
pled trade-offs between the open issues presented in this arti-
cle. Rather than tackling these issues one by one and in an
isolated manner, we need to thoroughly understand their rela-
tionships and dependencies if we expect to make any real
progress in the area. This is in part why several of the valuable
proposals made so far have never reached the deployment
stage. Unfortunately, this is not the only reason. It is also due
to the fact that ISPs are reluctant to introduce changes and test
them if there is no clear source of revenue. Clearly, this makes
the problem of making real progress even harder.
We emphasize that while some of the issues exposed in this arti-
cle are rooted in the intrinsic limitations of BGP and the current
interdomain routing architecture, others derive from the intricate
interactions and dependencies between domains. As we have
described, routing management is performed in an autonomous
manner by each domain, and the fact of greatest concern is that this
is done based on potentially conflicting policies. Thus, more social or
collaborative policies may need to be developed in the mid-term.
An alternative in the long term could be to gradually replace
BGP or even the whole interdomain routing paradigm. Howev-
er, this might be infeasible for IPv4-based networks given the
large installed base. From our perspective, future MPLS-based
and optical networks offer a neat path to address from scratch
several of the issues exposed in this article. We should take
advantage of the lessons learned and avoid incurring the same
mistakes of the past.
References
[1] R. Atkinson and S. Floyd, Eds., "IAB Concerns and Recommendations Regarding
Internet Research and Evolution," RFC 3869, Aug. 2004.
[2] G. Huston, "Analyzing the Internet's BGP Routing Table," IP J., vol. 4, no. 1, 2001.
[3] https://cba.ccaba.upc.es/research/bgp/
[4] CIDR report, July 2005: http://www.cidr-report.org/
[5] L. Subramanian et al., "Characterizing the Internet Hierarchy from Multiple Van-
tage Points," INFOCOM 2002.
[6] Y. Rekhter and T. Li, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)," RFC 1771, Mar. 1995.
[7] S. Halabi and D. McPherson, Internet Routing Architectures, 2nd ed., Cisco Press, 2001.
[8] S. Agarwal, C. Chuah, and R. Katz, "OPCA: Robust Interdomain Policy Routing
and Traffic Control," IEEE OPENARCH, Apr. 2003.
[9] C. Labovitz et al., "Delayed Internet Routing Convergence," Proc. ACM SIG-
COMM, 2000.
[10] T. Griffin and B. Presmore, "An Experimental Analysis of BGP Convergence
Time," Proc. IEEE ICNP, Nov. 2001.
[11] C. Villamizar, R. Chandra, and R. Govindan, "BGP Route Flap Damping," RFC
2439, Nov. 1998.
[12] Z. M. Mao et al., "Route Flap Damping Exacerbates Internet Routing Conver-
gence," Proc.ACM SIGCOMM, 2002.
[13] A. Bremler-Barr, Y. Afek, and S. Schwarz, "Improved BGP Convergence via
Ghost Flushing," Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2003.
[14] D. Pei et al., "BGP-RCN: Improving BGP Convergence through Root Cause Notifi-
cation," Comp. Net., vol. 48, no. 2, 2005, pp. 175-94.
[15] J. Chandrashekar et al., "Limiting Path Exploration in BGP," Proc. INFCOM,
Miami, FL, 2005.
[16] A. Feldmann et al., "Locating Internet Routing Instabilities," Proc. ACM SIG-
COMM, Portland, OR, Sep. 2004.
[17] T. Bu, L. Gao, and D. Towsley, "On Routing Table Growth," Proc. IEEE Global
Internet Symp., 2002.
[18] S. Bellovin et al., "Slowing Routing Table Growth by Filtering Based on Address
Allocation Policies," unpublished manuscript, June 2001.
[19] IETF Site Multihoming in IPv6 Working Group, http://www.ietf.org/html.
charters/multi6-charter.html.
[20] T. G. Griffin and G. T. Wilfong, "An Analysis of BGP Convergence Properties,"
Proc. SIGCOMM, Cambridge, MA, Aug. 1999, pp. 277-88.
[21] T. G. Griffin, F. B. Shepherd, and G. Wilfong, "The Stable Paths Problem and Inter-
domain Routing," IEEE/ACM Trans. Net., vol. 10, no. 2, Apr. 2002, pp. 232–43.
[22] A. D. Jaggard and V. Ramachandran, "Towards the Design of Robust Inter-
domain Routing Protocols," IEEE Network, Special Issue on Interdomain Routing,
Nov./Dec. 2005.
[23] C. Labovitz, A. Ahuja, and F. Jahanian, "Experimental Study of Internet Stability
and Backbone Failures," Proc. FTCS-29, 29th Int'l. Symp. Fault-Tolerant Comp.,
Madison, WI, June 1999, pp. 278-85.
[24] A. Shaikh et al., "Routing Stability in Congested Networks: Experimentation and
Analysis," Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, Stockholm, Sweden, Aug. 2000. 
[25] L. Xiao and K. Nahrstedt, "Reliability Models and Evaluation of Internal BGP Net-
works," Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 2004, Hong Kong, China, Mar. 2004.
[26] O. Nordstrom and C. Dovrolis, "Beware of BGP attacks," ACM SIGCOMM
Comp. Commun. 2004.
[27] S. Murphy, "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis," Internet draft, draft-ietf-idr-
bgp-vuln-01.txt, Oct. 2004, work in progress.
[28] A. Heffernan, "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option,"
RFC 2385, Aug. 1998.
[29] R. Mahajan, D. Wetherall and T. Anderson," Understanding BGP Misconfigura-
tions," ACM SIGCOMM 2002, Aug. 2002.
[30] S. Kent, C. Lynn, and K. Seo, "Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)," IEEE
JSAC, Apr. 2000.
[31] G. Goodell et al., "Working Around BGP: An Incremental Approach to Improv-
ing Security and Accuracy of Interdomain Routing," NDSS, Feb. 2003.
[32] W. Aiello, J. Ioannidis, and P. McDaniel, "Origin Authentication in Interdomain
Routing," Proc. 10th ACM Conf. Comp. and Commun. Sec., 2003.
[33] R. White, "Securing BGP through Secure Origin BGP," IP J., Sept. 2003.
[34] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and M. Sirbu, "SPV: Secure Path Vector Routing for Securing
BGP," ACM SIGCOMM 2004, Sept. 2004.
[35] M. Zhao, S. Smith, and D. Nicol, "The Performance Impact of BGP Security,"
IEEE Network, special issue on Interdomain Routing, Nov./Dec. 2005.
[36] B. Huffaker et al., "Distance Metrics in the Internet," IEEE Int'l. Telecommun.
Symp., 2002.
[37] D. Walton, A. Retana, and E. Chen, "Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP,"
Internet draft, draft-walton-bgp-add-paths-04.txt, Aug. 2005, work in progress.
[38] T. Bates, R. Chandra, and E. Chen, "Route Reflection — An Alternative to Full
Mesh iBGP," RFC 2796, IETF, Apr. 2000.
[39] P. Traina, "Autonomous System Confederations for BGP," RFC 1965, June 1996.
[40] Y. Rekhter, "Constructing Intra-AS Path Segments for an Inter-AS Path," ACM
SIGCOMM Comp. Commun., 1991.
[41] A. Sridharan, S. B. Moon, and C. Diot, "On the Correlation between Route
Dynamics and Routing Loops," Proc. IMC, Miami, FL, Oct. 2003.
[42] T. G. Griffin and G. Wilfong, "On the Correctness of iBGP Configuration," Proc.
ACM SIGCOMM 2002, Aug. 2002.
[43] R. K. C. Chang and M. Lo, "Inbound Traffic Engineering for Multihomed ASes
Using AS Path Prepending," IEEE Network, Mar. 2005.
[44] B. Quoitin et al., "Interdomain Traffic Engineering with Redistribution Communi-
ties," Comp. Commun., vol. 27, no. 4, 2004.
[45] F. Guo et al., "Experiences in Building a Multihoming Load Balancing System,"
INFOCOM 2004, 2004.
[46] B. Quoitin and O. Bonaventure, "A Cooperative Approach to Interdomain Traffic
Engineering," 1st Conf. Next Gen. Internet Networks TE (NGI 2005), Rome,
Italy, 2005.
[47] A. Akella, S Seshan, and A. Shaikh, "Multihoming Performance Benefits: An
Experimental Evaluation of Practical Enterprise Strategies," USENIX Annual Tech.
Conf. 2004, Boston, MA.
[48] S. Agarwal, A. Nucci, and S. Bhattacharyya, "Controlling Hot Potatoes in
Intradomain Traffic Engineering," SPRINT ATL res. rep. RR04-ATL-070677, July
2004.
[49] S. Uhlig et al., "Implications of the Topological Properties of Internet Traffic on
Traffic Engineering," Proc. 19th ACM Symp. Applied Comp., Special Track on
Comp. Networks, Nicosia, Cyprus, Mar. 2004.
[50] J. Rexford et al., "BGP routing Stability of Popular Destinations," Proc. Internet
Measurement Wksp., Nov. 2002.
[51] M. Morrow et al., "Challenges in Enabling Interprovider Service Quality in the
Internet," IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 43, no. 6, June 2005.
[52] E. Crawley et al., "A Framework for QoS-based Routing in the Internet," RFC
2386, Aug. 1998.
[53] L. Xiao et al., "QoS extensions to BGP," ICNP2002, Nov. 2002.
Biographies
MARCELO YANNUZZI (yannuzzi@ac.upc.edu) received a degree in electrical engi-
neering from the University of the Republic, Uruguay, in 2001, and a D.E.A.
from the Technical University of Catalonia (UPC), Spain, in 2005. He is currently
a Ph.D. student at the Department of Computer Architecture, UPC. His current
research interests are in the area of interdomain routing and traffic engineering
in both IP and optical networks.
XAVIER MASIP-BRUIN (xmasip@ac.upc.edu) received M.S. and Ph.D. degrees
from UPC, both in telecommunications engineering, in 1997 and 2003,
respectively. He is currently an associate professor of computer science at UPC.
His current research interests lie in broadband communications, QoS manage-
ment and provision, and traffic engineering. His publications include around
40 papers in national and international refereed journals and conferences.
Since 2000 he has participated in many research projects: IST projects E-
NEXT, NOBEL, and EuQoS; and Spanish research projects SABA, SABA2,
SAM, and TRIPODE.
OLIVIER BONAVENTURE (http://www.info.ucl.ac.be/people/OBO) leads the net-
work research group at Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Belgium. His cur-
rent research interests include intra- and interdomain routing, traffic engineering,
and network security.
YANNUZZI LAYOUT  11/3/05  12:07 PM  Page 56
                                                                                                                       
